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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to examine the roles and identities of engineers constituting one of the 
fundamental, but a completely indescribable community in modern big science with particle 
accelerators. Large communities of accelerator and detector specialists, which replaced 
experimenters and instrumentalists of the middle of the last century, themselves exhibit a complex 
structure and are divided. However, this division is in turn grounded on the division of those whose 
activities focus on the phenomena of nature considered independent of human beings and those 
who design processes and phenomena of an artificial, technical nature. Nevertheless, in terms of 
their modus operandi and identity, the kinship between engineers and experimental scientists is 
considerable. I argue that such exclusion of the engineering community from epistemic practices 
can serve as an example of participatory injustice. As one of the ways to transcend participatory 
injustice, I suggest that the communities should be encouraged to work together in epistemically 
tantamount roles while structural hindrances to the mobility between communities need to be 
alleviated. 
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Introduction 
 
Contemporary fundamental science has a number of significant contrasts with the science of the 
early 20th century. Having become a complex social institution in its very structure, it demanded 
the eliciting and scrutinizing of the communities that make up research teams and the features of 
their interaction. Several outstanding studies have been undertaken by a number of historians, 
philosophers, and sociologists of science (Galison 1987; Pickering 1988; Collins 2002, Hoddeson 
et al. 2008, Knorr-Cetina 1999, Traweek 1988, Latour and Woolgar 1979). The objective of this 
work is to examine the phenomenon of the big science community in its development and the 
influence of the rise of an elementary particle accelerator and a complex elementary particle 
detector in it on the amplification of the social structure, the deepening of the epistemic division 
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of labor and the need for lengthy engineering activity at the stage of preparation of experiments. 
To accomplish that task, it becomes necessary to clarify the roles of members of scientific 
communities and the dynamics of changes in their structure, to discuss the difficulties of 
classification and identities of community members, as well as issues that arise at the present stage 
in the relationship of scientific and engineering activities and possible ways to resolve them. 
 
Notably, the rise of the accelerator in the 1930s–1940s was the first milestone in the development 
of a modern complex physics experiment and the complication of the structure of communities 
associated with large-scale experiments in high-energy physics. First, the emergence of such a 
large and complex device as an accelerator led to the appearance of accelerator physicists (and 
engineers) as scientific and technical specializations. Their task comprised the design of the 
accelerator, the calculation and optimization of its parameters, as well as ensuring its operation 
(providing particle beams accelerated to the required energies and intensities, to the community of 
experimentalists). The creation of the accelerator not only led to the spatial separation of the 
theoretician working silently in their Ivory Tower from the experimentalist, who now had to spend 
most of their time in the experimental halls near the accelerator, where their installation was 
established. In addition to the communities of experimentalists and theorists, with the beginning 
of experiments on accelerators, a community of accelerator specialists emerged, engaged in the 
creation and maintenance of the accelerator machine. Galison (1987) also introduced a community 
of instrumentalists involved in the creation of scientific instruments and installations, and formally 
accelerator scientists could be classified as such a community because the accelerator is a 
technically sophisticated device whose operating principles are essentially based on classical 
electrodynamics. However, in such a case, it would turn out to be very heterogeneous because the 
expertise of the accelerator researcher and the instrumentalist, who builds, for example, a particle 
detector, will differ. 
 
Beginning from the 1970s and finally by the beginning of the 1990s, a detector—a device in which 
particles born in collisions of a beam are detected, and their characteristics are identified by 
measurement, ended up to be so tangled and universalized that it morphed into the central object 
of the experiment that in many respects began to designate the long-term directions of research in 
accelerator laboratories (Hoddeson 2008). The structure of the corresponding communities began 
to change accordingly. Now, experimenters became engaged in detector calculations and design 
for a long time, taking on some of the tasks that were previously assigned to instrumentalists (in 
particular, engineers), then undertaking measurements with it and analyzing the data for an equally 
long time. After a series of measurements, they often continued to improve the design of the 
detectors and their components, returning to the engineering kind of work, again measuring and 
analyzing until the range of tasks that can be solved with this type of detector and accelerator 
capabilities was exhausted. All together, it took dozens of years, sometimes the whole conscious 
life of the experimentalist of this particular type of detector or the same detector. However, the 
communities of accelerator and detector researchers themselves are also heterogeneous. We shall 
consider their structure in more detail. 
 
Accelerator and detector researchers 
 
Starting from the 1990s, one can assume that instead of communities of theorists, experimenters, 
and instrumentalists, in high-energy physics, one should talk about communities of theorists, 
accelerator, and detector researchers. The structure of the theoretician community has not changed 
much, while other communities have undergone the greatest changes since the first third of the 
20th century. The community of accelerator specialists now builds and maintains the accelerator, 
and the community of detector specialists—the detector. Instrumentalists can now be considered 
a subset of detector and accelerator specialists, and the dividing line between them and detector 
experimental experts is rather blurred. At the stage of creating the setup, the distinction between 
experimental scientists and nonscientists is such that, although they both study processes in the 
detector on computational models, the former focus more on aspects related to future searches for 
a useful signal, its reconstruction (reconstruction of events occurring in the detector by triggering 
numerous sensors), while the second—on aspects related to ensuring the overall operability of the 
installation. The second difference between them becomes evident after the beginning of 
measurements at the setup, when the scientists participate in the data acquisition, and then enter 
on processing and analysis of the data, while the instrumentalists set about the creation of other 
installations and instruments. 
 
Until about the 30s of the 20th century, the role of an instrumentalist did not exist because their 
functions were divided between the experimentalist and engineer as follows: the experimentalist 
formulated the technical requirements for the device (installation) to the engineer (industry) in the 
form of a set of requirements and those independently manufactured the device, most of which 
was standard and serial. Then, the experimentalist performed measurements on the setup, 
performing its adjustment as necessary, as well as data analysis, which was quite simple and not 
requiring separate education and specialization. With the birth of Big Science and the resulting 
complexity and uniqueness of the installations, the technical design specifications are becoming a 
joint product of experimentalists and toolmakers, resulting from a compromise and trade-off 
between a multitude of installation requirements. In this sense, the instrumentalist (and nowadays, 
the detector and accelerator researchers) is a transitional type between the engineer and the 
experimenter, and their own instrumentalists appear in both the accelerator and detector 
communities. 
 
Roles and specializations in megascience 
 
Each of these communities now become heterogeneous (see Table 1). Accelerator specialists also 
began to be divided into theorists (calculators) performing computational modeling of the particle 
acceleration, experimentalists who conducted experimental measurements of the developed 
accelerator assemblies to help create its technical theories, as well as engineers manufacturing the 
accelerator assemblies and performing their tuning and adjustment. Detector scientists are divided 
by the type of detector unit, which they simulate and build, and then support during the 
measurements and data which they own for analysis after the experiments. With the advent of the 
era of complex hybrid detectors, the detector began to consist of several complex, but 
heterogeneous system units, for example, such as a time-of-flight system, calorimeter, tracker, or 
shielding against the cosmic background. Each of these units, from its design period until the 
completion of the experiment, was under the responsibility of a certain group of experimentalists, 
which assumed both a number of technical issues and a physical interpretation of the data harvested 
from it. These groups together form a community of detector scientists. Engineers are entrusted 
with the development of installations, accelerators, and their units according to the technical 
specifications, maintenance of installations, accelerators, and software. 
 
 
Area Role Specialization 
Accelerator Accelerator Physicist Accelerator Theorist 
Accelerator experimentalist 
Engineer Accelerator Engineer 
Detector Detector physicist Unit scientist 
 Data measurer 
 Data analyst 
Engineer Unit engineer 
Phenomena theory Theorist Model developer 
Developer of calculation tools 
and methods 
Computing Programmer 
System Tools Developer 
Engineer Software Maintenance 
 
Table 1. The structure and functions of communities in high-energy physics. 
 
 
Experimentalists' identity and engineering 
 
To grasp the social processes in the high-energy physics laboratory, the nature of community 
interactions, their similarities, and dissimilarities, it is necessary to elucidate the identities of their 
members. As one of the signs of the experimenter’s “identity shift,” characteristic of the period of 
the 1970s, the awkwardness felt by the experimental physicist toward others (including the 
engineer) in the laboratory began to be noted (Galison 1997, 5). This “identity shift,” was ascribed 
to the fact that the very nature of experimentation has changed: if earlier the experimenter’s work 
was unambiguously associated with the design of the installation, the development of experimental 
procedures, the application of these procedures, the recording of results, and their theoretical 
analysis, then later the experimenter was considered to be the one who only analyzes the data 
harvest hiding behind the monitor a long distance away from the installation threshing mill. Hence, 
it became impossible to have a single view of what can be considered experimentation (which is 
reflected in Table 1). Another distinctive feature of this stage of the development of science can 
be considered the complex contradiction between the experimentalist and engineer on the one 
hand, and the productive tension between the experimentalist and theorist on the other (Galison 
1997, 5). 
For the sake of our analysis, in the above claims, we highlight the following central narratives: 1) 
the contradictions between the experimenter and other specialists of the scientific laboratory 
(theorist and engineer) that have been growing since the 1970s and 2) the emergence of 
experimentalists who were not engaged in the activities previously considered traditional, such as 
creating a facility and experimental procedures for it. These observations appear to be based on 
the following premises. 
First, the community of experimenters implicitly related to detector specialists (as reflected in 
Table 1) is not uniform but covers a wide range of activities. As was noted, experimentation begins 
to shift toward data analysis. In practice, it is often believed that, because data analysis constitutes 
an interpretation of the processes occurring in the detector, in terms of high-level theories, bearing 
upon the language of instrumental theories in which the principles of the functioning of detectors 
are rooted, the outcome of this procedure is what directly becomes the experimental result. Because 
obtaining the measurement result is the experiment’s main aim, therefore, the experimentalist, first 
of all, can be deemed the one whose activity immediately delivers the result, that is, an analysis of 
detector data. 
Notably, most of the participants in the analysis of data (experimentalists) in the period preceding 
the acquisition and analysis of data are also engaged in the creation of detectors and procedures 
for them. Thus, the scope of their activity also partially covers that which belongs to the expertise 
of instrumentalists (who may also be engineers)—the creation of instruments. On the one hand, 
considering the fact that the creation of the device and the corresponding procedures take a long 
time (years and even tens of years), the experimenter had to devote a lot of time to the activities 
that are very close to engineering ones, de facto becoming a highly professional engineer. This 
may raise a legitimate question, why is one of them identified as a detector physicist 
(experimentalist) and the other as an engineer when their work and professional expertise are so 
similar? On the other hand, the epistemic distinctions in the nature of their work also blurred: the 
experimental search, in addition to being carried out, as before, in terms of the dominant theories, 
was increasingly guided and determined by these theories; the discovery of new phenomena was 
increasingly dependent on the development of high-level theories. Thus, experimentation became 
more and more tangibly the construction of theoretical natural objects, which was closer to the 
work of the designer than before. This became especially pronounced during the period of success 
of the Standard Model in elementary particle physics, which predicted many particles that were 
subsequently measured experimentally. This could not but affect the identity of the 
experimentalist, as well as the perception of the experimenter by the engineer as a theoretician. 
The shift of identity, therefore, arose in connection with the need for lengthy engineering work for 
the experimentalist (because the creation of the installations took a long time and was not serial 
due to their uniqueness), on the one hand, and the increased constructiveness of the 
experimentation itself, on the other. This entailed the actual blurring of the lines between the nature 
of the work of the experimentalist and engineer, which was initially opposed much due to distinct 
educational trajectories, which are also linked by the mass consciousness with the level of possible 
scientific horizons and achievable professional competencies. 
 
Why is a scientist more prestigious than an engineer? 
 
Joseph Martin (Martin 2017) has recently argued that prestige of different social and epistemic 
groups in science, for example, particle physics and applied science (or engineering), is 
asymmetric (the latter being the least prestigious). The question of what constitutes an engineer’s 
identity requires, first and foremost, an answer to two interrelated questions: Who is an engineer 
and what features make a person an engineer? Modern literature on identity theory distinguishes 
cognitive (internal) and social (external) identity (Anderson 2010; Wenger 1998). In the case of 
an engineer, the former part is predicated upon what they know about the profession, how they 
understands their role, what they want (may want) or do not want (may not want) to know 
professionally. This part is set not only by the engineer’s personal cognitive peculiarities but also 
by the interrelation of their professional role as an engineer with the whole variety of other roles 
their play in life. The latter part, the social one, is not the traits that an engineer acquires in the 
course of professional practice, but those shaped by their membership in a social group. The latter 
part is formed by the community as a result of belonging to it, as well as by other communities 
and society as a whole, with which the engineer interacts and in which the attitude toward 
engineers as a social group is defined. This view raises the question of the stability of such an 
identity and the need for such conditions in the formation of the so-called engineering identity in 
general. Speaking of engineers as a social group, it becomes necessary to distinguish between an 
engineer, as the holder of engineering education, and an engineer as a performer of the role of an 
engineer. 
To establish what constitutes an engineer’s identity in science, one has to answer the initial 
question of what features and functions make one an engineer. In the practice of scientific 
laboratories in basic science (for example, elementary particle physics), the role of an engineer 
implies working with complex technical systems, but first, we will clarify what the disparities 
between engineers and scientists boil down to. Historically, these distinctions are rooted in an 
understanding of the very nature of the activities of these communities and the goals for which 
these activities, namely scientific and technical research, are oriented. Most approaches to 
distinguishing science and technology in one way or another reflect the Aristotelian distinction 
between ἐπιστήµη (episteme) as knowledge, understanding, or cognition and τέχνη (techne) as 
craft or practical art. The first, according to Aristotle, is a theoretical knowledge of eternal and 
universal things that exist by virtue of their necessity; the second is the creation of transient and 
perishable, i.e., practical things. From here originates the ontological distinction between 
“knowledge of what” and “knowledge of how,” knowledge of the true (first) and useful (second). 
In this regard, a “dichotomy of intellectual status” arose in science and society (Boon 2011, p. 63): 
higher status of science and lower of technology. At the same time, several authors point out the 
difficulties of discerning scientific and technical knowledge in modern science, and also advocate 
the possibility of considering them as either including one another (technical includes epistemic), 
or even as independent of each other (Boon 2011). 
Nonanalyzing data detector and accelerator researchers can be classified as technically oriented 
scientists (except when they are studying new phenomena during the development of instruments). 
Engineers (they are not included in the classification (Galison 1987) because they are not classified 
as scientists) are not engaged in the science of independent development of new devices or study 
of new phenomena in technical systems, but operate and establish such systems or develop in 
accordance with the terms of reference, which are formulated by scientists. An engineer who is 
developing a new system or exploring it according to our view should be classified as a scientist. 
Thus, the physics of high energies retains the basis of the Aristotelian dichotomy of epistemic and 
technical which is reflected in the hierarchy of activities and communities in science from pure 
theorizing about natural phenomena (epistemics) down to technology applications (engineers). 
Signs of dichotomy remain, however, because even in mixed, intermediate cases, such as those of 
detector experimental physicists, their activities are clearly divided into two types of roles: the 
design of the device (for example, the tracker) is technical, its operation is also technical, and the 
analysis of data with the formulation of theoretical statements is scientific (epistemic). The same 
applies to the detector scientist, in whose work the epistemic part (the study of new natural 
phenomena suitable for creating new devices) and the technical (construction, design, and 
operation of devices) can clearly be traced. At the poles are theorists, all of whose roles are 
epistemic and engineers, all of which are technical (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Figure 1. Epistemic hierarchy of 
communities in high-energy physics. 
Detector, as well as accelerator, researchers perform both epistemic and technical roles (which 
clearly differ, preserving the dichotomy), however, if the technical roles of the experimentalist 
(data analysis) are subjected to the measurement of the phenomena under scrutiny as an immediate 
goal, then even the epistemic goals of instrumentalists are resigned to improving the device designs 
(for example, of a particle accelerator), in connection with which the experimenters find 
themselves higher in the epistemic hierarchy. Here we assume the data-analyzing detector 
researchers to be experimentalists while both nondata-analyzing detector scientists and accelerator 
researchers are instrumentalists. 
 
Engineering and epistemic justice in megascience 
 
Thus, we have argued that the dissimilarity between engineering and other types of scientific 
activity do not resolve into the identity or constructive nature of the activity, but, first of all, are 
governed by perceived property relations and the rights claimed to experimental data that arise due 
to involvement in the data acquisition process. It is immixture in epistemically significant practices 
and affiliation in the data-harvesting community that come to the forefront in distinguishing an 
experimentalist from an engineer. Restrictions on the access of certain groups to epistemic 
practices based on their social or professional group membership and external identity raise the 
issue of epistemic justice. 
 
Although epistemic injustice has been extensively discussed in the philosophical literature during 
the last decades (Fricker 2007; Anderson 2012; Medina 2012; Pohlhaus 2017), only very recently 
was the attention of scholars attracted to the internal workings of the scientific community 
(Grasswick 2017; Perović 2017; Pronskikh 2018; Pla-Julián 2018). The account by Fricker (2007) 
originally identifies two types of epistemic injustice and considers them in relation to prejudice 
against social identities of certain discourse participants. As was extensively discussed above, 
contemporary big science, especially high-energy physics, exhibits a complex social structure. The 
Theorists 
Experimentalists 
Instrumentalists 
Engineers 
epistemic 
technical 
community that constitutes it is stratified into subcommunities associated with certain epistemic 
and technical practices, which are unequal in their epistemic weight and value (Galison 1997). 
These communities develop various technical languages for communication, and some of them are 
functionally and linguistically subordinate to others which puts them in epistemically unequal 
positions (Pronskikh 2018).  
 
In her original book, Fricker (2007, 158) suggested two types of epistemic injustice: testimonial 
injustice, which is due to systematic credibility discounting to people of certain disadvantaged or 
stigmatized social identities, and hermeneutical, which implies that members of socially 
marginalized groups lack resources to make meaning of their experience interpretable by the 
society. The remedies to both testimonial and hermeneutic injustices suggested by Fricker (2007) 
are respective virtues that individuals must exercise to counteract their prejudices. In Anderson 
(2012), the individual virtue-based remedies for epistemic injustices are challenged along two lines 
of argument. First, because cognitive biases are rooted deeply in the mind and have an automatic 
character, prejudicial hearers may discount the interlocutor’s testimony because they perceive it 
incompetent or dishonest. Therefore, cognitive biases are difficult to control, although well-
intentioned agents can train themselves to practice cognitive dissonance to discount their 
perceptions. Second, the credibility of the social groups can be discounted or favored not only on 
a transactional basis but also due to their belonging to a group (for example, certain ethnicity or 
using certain grammar). In the case, for example, of group favoritism or bias, there is no 
transactional injustice, on the contrary, in-group trust is vital in cases of division of labor 
(Anderson 2012, 170). Such cases cause, however, structural testimonial injustice and call for 
structural changes for their remedy. In her view, redesigning social institutions is unavoidable to 
mitigate structural epistemic injustice. 
 
In the engineering context, the most relevant is seen as the concept of participatory injustice 
proposed by Hookway (2010) to clarify the forms of testimonial and hermeneutic injustices 
(Fricker 2007). Hookway (2010) pins down that “Participating is not just a matter of exchanging 
information: it involves asking questions, floating ideas, considering alternative possibilities, and 
so on.” He concludes “epistemic injustice that is directed at someone’s functioning as a participant 
in discussion, deliberation, and inquiry does not simply cause the victim to lose epistemic 
confidence more generally. Rather it questions the possession of capacities that are necessary for 
participation in these kinds of epistemic activities.” (p. 6) Excluding engineers who, as we 
explained earlier, have most of the basic skills necessary for a scientist belonging to more 
epistemically significant discourses and practices, such as the collection and processing of 
experimental data, their discussion and presentation of the results of cognition outside, in our 
opinion is an example of epistemic injustice. In this regard, participatory injustice should be 
considered alongside other types of injustice, which is also structural in nature, i.e., requires 
institutional efforts, not just individual ones to transcend them. 
 
Anatomizing the problem of institutional epistemic justice, Anderson (2012) points out that the 
epistemic segregation of the communities is just as unfair as ethnic or racial biases. However, 
collaborative learning and research can help overcome the bias of individuals and more privileged 
groups over less privileged ones. In the context of scientific and engineering communities, we 
believe that, in relation to scientific research and megascience in particular, collaborative learning 
and research can mean that representatives of separate communities (both detector and accelerator 
communities and, within these communities, research and engineering) should not only complete 
the same training courses, but also jointly discuss and contribute to all stages of research, from 
accelerated particles and facilities to data analysis and phenomenological theoretical calculations. 
Moreover, mobility between communities must be ensured, providing the opportunity and ability 
to move from engineers to scientists. This will help both to transcend the perception of boundary 
objects as delimiters between epistemic and nonepistemic communities and to fulfill the ethical 
requirement of epistemic equality, which is considered a condition of epistemic democracy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the community structure in high-energy physics, which for decades has been 
considered as including instrumentalists, experimenters, and theorists. In our view, the first two 
communities are more correctly regarded as accelerator and detector researchers, which can be 
divided into several groups, including engineers and other specializations. I seek to address the 
noted issue of a shift in the identity of the experimentalists and explain it through the convergence 
of the constructive nature of work of the experimentalist with the engineer as well as the advent of 
specialists of a narrower profile in the place of the classical experimentalist with epistemic division 
of labor. Under the conditions of a similar nature of labor against the background of narratively 
fixed perceptions about their purported scientific expertise and horizons, this could entail a certain 
crisis of the experimentalist’s identity. We note that identities of the experimentalist and engineer 
began to blur and overlap, and their activity formulas nowadays almost coincide. The basis of the 
external distinction between engineers and nonengineers, as before, is the orientation of their 
constructive activities either toward the artificial, technical nature (among the former) or by natural 
phenomena (among the latter). At the same time, the engineering, constructing nature of labor 
turns out to be characteristic of both scientists and engineers, and the formal orientation of the 
activity toward artificial nature as a functional role, as a rule, serves as the basis for the refusal of 
engineering specialists to participate in experiments and analyze data. I argue that the exclusion of 
engineers and other nonscientist specializations in megascience from epistemically most valuable 
discourses and practices was considered by us in the framework of the concept of participatory 
epistemic injustice. I suggest an avenue of approach to overcome participatory injustice, such as 
joint projects for engineering and nonengineering specializations, in which they cast themselves 
in epistemically equipollent roles. 
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